The main news of the current sanctions cycle is the European Commission's proposal to expand restrictions to the port of Kulevi in Georgia and the port of Karimun in Indonesia. It must be acknowledged that the selection of these locations is justified. Kulevi is an important terminal for the transshipment of oil products in the Black Sea, which Ukraine finds challenging to attack. Meanwhile, Karimun has long established itself as a key hub for Ship-to-Ship operations in Southeast Asia. Reportedly, away from the sight of European regulators, oil blends and transshipments occur here, allowing the true origin of the raw materials to be concealed.
In addition to infrastructure, plans include adding another 42 tankers to the lists, underscoring the scale of the "inventory" of the shadow segment.
Behind these quantitative metrics lies a qualitative change in the tactics of the sanctioning authorities. Brussels has realized that merely blocking vessels is ineffective; VG has already analyzed the cases where tankers, after being removed from classification societies or losing insurance, simply changed their names, ownership, and flags, continuing operations through offshore chains. Now, the EU is targeting financial schemes—sanctions include banks from Tajikistan, Laos, and Kyrgyzstan that facilitated transactions bypassing Western systems.
The daily reality of the shadow fleet in recent years resembles an endless series with constant changes of scenery. Under pressure from secondary sanctions, Barbados and Panama have started to revoke flags from vessels suspected of transporting Russian oil. This has triggered a migration of the fleet to jurisdictions like Gabon or the Comoros, yet it has not halted the flow. The "gray" fleet demonstrates a remarkable ability to regenerate: in the place of one liquidated operating company, such as the Indian Gatik, several less visible structures immediately emerge.
The new EU initiative aims to deprive these vessels of basic operational capabilities. Restrictions on refueling, repairs, and any technical maintenance in ports represent an attempt to force "shadows" into a state of complete autonomy, which is technically impossible for aging ships that make up the backbone of the gray fleet.
"Sanctions against the shadow fleet are not something fundamentally new; after all, both the EU and the UK have repeatedly imposed restrictions on tankers transporting Russian oil.
Far greater dangers may arise from restrictions on servicing shadow fleet vessels in any EU ports.
This includes not only insurance services but also any other operations, from oil transshipment in the territorial waters of EU countries to ship calls in maritime ports. "Second-tier" restrictions could complicate export logistics, thus increasing the costs of exporting oil and oil products," explained Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of Open Oil Market, to VG.
Despite the firm tone of the European Commission, there is no observed unity within the EU itself. Greece and Malta—countries with significant trading fleets—have already opposed the ban on services for transporting oil from Russia. For Athens, maritime shipping is not only budgetary revenues but also a leverage in global labor division. Restricting the operation of Greek tankers carrying Russian raw materials automatically raises the market into the hands of Asian or Middle Eastern players, which does not inspire optimism among Mediterranean shipowners.
"Brussels is trying to impose political rules on a market that is, by its nature, global and anarchic. We see that even with stringent measures, loopholes remain. The lifting of sanctions on two Chinese banks amid pressure on Central Asian banks is an obvious nod to Beijing. This is a recognition that without China's participation, any attempt at a financial blockade of maritime exports turns into fiction," notes a source in the maritime trade sector.
Indeed, the selectivity of sanctions emphasizes their political underpinning. By punishing the ports of Georgia and Indonesia, the EU aims to create a precedent that will make other neutral harbors consider the risks. However, logistics always seeks the path of least resistance. Increased freight costs and rising insurance premiums are built into the final price while discounts on raw materials allow these costs to be offset.
The maritime industry is entering a period of ultimate fragmentation. The EU's efforts to block third-country ports and expand the tanker lists will not lead to an immediate halt in exports but claim to radically change its economics.
We see the emergence of a "parallel" port infrastructure and financial circuits operating outside the reach of Western law.
Should the 20th package be adopted in such a resolute form, it will accelerate the aging of the global fleet (as new ships will avoid toxic routes) and lead to further increases in logistical hurdles. For Russian exports, this means an inevitable increase in transportation costs and the necessity for investments in one’s own port infrastructure in friendly regions.
In practice, the jubilee sanctions package risks turning into "the last Chinese warning." The effectiveness of sanctions has become more about public relations than about economics. Behind the stern words, there is neither unity within the EU nor unequivocal mass support from voters, nor a mechanism for total control over sanctions enforcement. The decline in the influence of once-powerful European countries leads to a reduction in the risk of non-compliance with the rules they impose. As the experience of America shows, to demand something, one must send in an aircraft carrier. And there are no gunboats for all dissenters.
Source: Vgudok
