New EU Sanctions Against Ports and Tankers: How They Will Affect Exports

The 21st package of EU sanctions against Russia will affect the infrastructure for hydrocarbon exports: LNG tankers, the shadow fleet, and oil ports. RBC explored the complexities these actions from Brussels will create for the oil and logistics business. The European Commission (EC) has announced the 21st package of sanctions against Russia, as noted in an official statement on the organization's website. The restrictions will target Russian banks and the defense industry, and there will also be a ban on entry into the EU for Russian military personnel. The EC has also announced new sanctions against the Russian shadow fleet: an additional 30 vessels will be added to the EU's sanctions list of 632 ships, the names of which are not disclosed. For the first time, restrictions will be imposed on vessels providing services to the Russian shadow fleet, including bunkering services. Additionally, restrictions may be introduced regarding the ports and airports through which Russian oil is sold, as well as refineries using raw materials from Russia. Finally, there will be restrictions on the sale of LNG tankers to Russia.

Restrictions on Gas Carriers

EU countries have never sold liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers to Russia. The export projects of NOVATEK — "Yamal LNG" and "Arctic LNG-2" — rely on ships built in South Korea. One LNG carrier for the "Arctic LNG-2" project, the "Alexey Kosygin," was built and delivered to the customer by the Russian shipyard SSK "Zvezda" at the end of 2025. Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of the oil products marketplace Open Oil Market, reminded that most tankers for "Yamal LNG" were produced by South Korea's Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). "Perhaps the EU is trying to retroactively close a loophole that formally remained in the legislation. However, it would have been challenging to exploit such a loophole, given the overall sanctions backdrop," he stated. At the Center for Price Indices (CPI), it was noted that there are no shipyards in the EU for building tankers, but there are ship repair yards for servicing them, particularly in Denmark. "It’s possible that the sanctions will include servicing and repairs for Russian LNG tankers," they speculated. The CPI believes that the EU's new measures aim to "pressure" all consumers of Russian oil, including its largest buyers — China, India, and Turkey. Dmitry Kasatkin, managing partner at Kasatkin Consulting, asserts that the main risks related to LNG are likely not from direct supplies of new vessels from Europe but from services for the already operating fleet — maintenance, insurance, and vessel servicing. "For currently operating LNG projects, there will be no effect if sanctions do not impact existing long-term contracts and vessel maintenance. This measure may be more sensitive for new Arctic LNG projects, as specialized ice-capable LNG tankers are hard to replace: they are expensive, scarce, and technologically complex. But again, this will mostly complicate supply chains rather than eliminate the possibility of purchasing an LNG carrier," he believes. Constantin Pozdnyakov, advisor to the Rector of RGSU and Doctor of Economic Sciences, points out that the restrictions on LNG tankers include a ban on the technical servicing of Russian ships for liquefied gas transport, and from January 2027 it will be illegal to provide terminal services for Russian LNG, which will create difficulties for European ship repair companies and terminal operators. He argues that the most vulnerable will be companies providing auxiliary services to the shadow fleet (primarily bunkering vessels for refueling ships at sea), as well as ship technical support operators and insurance companies. For shipowners, this represents a significant increase in compliance risks, as even a single provision of services to a shadow fleet tanker may lead to being included in sanctions lists and losing access to European ports and financial services, the expert concludes.

The Shadow Fleet and Foreign Ports

Kasatkin believes that the effect concerning Russian service vessels working with the shadow fleet will be limited. For shipowners, this means increased risks, soaring insurance costs, and difficulties with chartering, repairs, and entering ports. However, the impact on established logistics will not be critical: chains can be restructured through other jurisdictions and service points. Tereshkin suggests that the sanctions against companies servicing the shadow fleet could theoretically complicate the logistics of oil exports for a time. However, this will not have a long-term effect — partly due to the regular re-registration of shadow fleet vessels and the release of some tankers following a sharp easing of sanctions against Venezuela. Commenting on possible sanctions against foreign maritime ports, Kasatkin noted that Russian oil and oil products primarily go for export through East Asian and Middle Eastern infrastructure: ports in Western India, oil terminals in China’s Shandong province and the eastern coast, Turkish ports and refineries, as well as certain transshipment and blending hubs in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Pozdnyakov stated that the main recipients of Russian oil in 2024-2026, following the introduction of European sanctions, will be India and China. "The key unloading ports will be India's Jamnagar and Vadinar, as well as Chinese terminals servicing independent refineries," the expert explained. Sanctions against ports and refineries working with Russian raw materials could theoretically affect major Indian and Turkish enterprises, but the EU lacks direct leverage over the infrastructure of third countries," notes Pozdnyakov. "New restrictions may create additional compliance risks for such facilities, but it is unlikely to lead to a halt in supply," added Kasatkin. "These measures are not directly aimed at the end buyer of Russian oil, and the farther the sanction restriction is from the end consumer, the less transparent the chain becomes, and the easier it is to restructure." He emphasized that there will likely be no effect on airports at all. "A separate issue is how all these restrictions will be enforced and controlled. We assume that Asian markets are opaque for the EU, and the enforcement of sanctions will be rather formal," adds Kasatkin. Tereshkin believes that the new sanctions could be sensitive for Turkish refineries that use Russian oil to produce petroleum products and subsequently supply fuel to Europe. "The EU has already imposed restrictions on the import of petroleum products produced using Russian oil. However, tracking compliance with such a ban is quite challenging. Therefore, new restrictions are imposed, which will increase risks for refineries operating with Russian raw materials," he explained. "Indian and Turkish refineries will face a choice between maintaining access to the European market and continuing to purchase discounted Russian raw materials," clarifies Pozdnyakov. "Many may prefer to redirect export flows to the growing Asian market. The long-term consequences will depend on the coordination of actions between the EU, the USA, and the UK." For Russian exports, he states, new sanctions mean further increases in logistics costs and the necessity to develop maritime transport infrastructure without European contractors. Source: RBC